Asset purchases have become an important monetary policy tool of the Federal Reserve in recent years. To date, most studies of the Federal Reserve's asset purchases have tried to measure the interest rate effects of the policies. Several papers provide evidence that these programs do have important effects on longer-term market interest rates. The theory of how asset purchases work, however, is less well developed. Some of the empirical studies point to "preferred habitat" models in which investors do not have the same objectives, and therefore prefer to hold different types and maturities of securities. We exploit Flow of Funds data to assess the types of investors that are selling to the Federal Reserve and their portfolio adjustment after these sales, which could provide a view to the plausibility of preferred habitat models and the transmission of unconventional monetary policy across asset markets. We find that the Federal Reserve is ultimately buying from only a handful of investor types, primarily households, with a different reaction to changes in Federal Reserve holdings of longer-term versus shorter-term assets.
Introduction
Asset purchases and sales ("asset programs") have become an important tool of the Federal Reserve in recent years. The intent of the asset programs to date is to put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates in order to provide additional monetary policy accommodation when further reductions in the federal funds rate are constrained by the zero lower bound. Whether and how these tools of monetary policy are effective are critical questions for the economics profession. Because the tools are still relatively new, substantially less research exists compared to the literature that traces the effects of traditional monetary policy on the economy.
To date, most studies of the Federal Reserve's asset programs have tried to answer whether these actions are effective at lowering longer-term interest rates and try to calibrate the interest rate effects of the policies. Several papers, such as Gagnon et al. (2011) , D'Amico and King (2010) , Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), and Ihrig et al. (2012) provide evidence that the asset programs do have important effects in lowering longer-term market interest rates. These studies employ a variety of techniques, from event studies, to time-series regression, to modeling the yield curve. Although some look to explicit measures of changes in the supply of longer-term securities to the markets as explanatory variables, they do not, in general, rely on a theoretical model as a basis for the estimation.
Indeed, the general theory of how asset purchases and sales by the central bank works is less well developed. Vayanos and Vila (2009) and Li and Wei (2012) point to "preferred habitat" models to provide a rationale. Preferred habitat models assume that there is a variety of investor types who have dissimilar objectives and, therefore, prefer to hold different types and maturities of securities. In such models, buying longer-term securities can affect longer-term rates because some investors are less willing to substitute into other assets. As a result, the prices of longerterm assets increase when the central bank decreases the supply of those assets relative to other assets.
In this paper, we exploit Flow of Funds data (described in the next section) to identify which types of investors are selling to the Federal Reserve during four different asset programs: Overall, our results suggest that the Federal Reserve is ultimately interacting with only a handful of investor types. Households (the group that includes hedge funds), broker-dealers, and insurance companies appear to be the largest sellers of Treasury securities when the Federal Reserve buys these securities. Households, investment companies, and to a lesser extent, pension funds, are the largest sellers of MBS when the Federal Reserve buys. With both the Federal Reserve's Treasury and MBS purchases, our results suggest that households are the largest, ultimate seller. Moreover, different investor types appear to react dissimilarly to changes in Federal Reserve holdings of longer-term versus shorter-term assets. This latter result is relevant for considering the maturity extension program (MEP) under which the Federal Reserve has been selling shorter-dated Treasury securities and buying long-term Treasury securities.
Overall, these results can be interpreted as supporting, at least in part, the preferred habitat theory.
Focusing on those investors that are participating in the Federal Reserve's asset programs, additional investigation shows how these investor types' portfolios are adjusting, which provides insight into the transmission of the Federal Reserve's asset purchases to broader financial markets. In particular, our results suggest that "households" -one of the investor classes most likely to sell to the Federal Reserve -reallocate their portfolios coincident with Federal Reserve purchases. Federal Reserve purchases of Treasury securities and MBS induce households to shift toward corporate bonds, commercial paper, and municipal debt and loans. In addition, when pension funds sell MBS to the Federal Reserve, they then shift their portfolio toward repurchase agreements, or very short-term assets. This evidence of shifting investors out of safe assets into riskier assets points to a credible monetary policy transmission channel for the effects of asset purchases on broader financial markets.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. We start with a discussion of the data. Then we focus on how the major investors and the Federal Reserve are interacting within the asset programs. From there we see how these investors rebalance their portfolios. Finally, we conclude.
Data
We focus our analysis on the low-frequency relationship of how securities move between and local governments, broker-dealers, and households. Much attention in popular press has been given to the amount of U.S. debt, especially federal debt that is held by foreign investors.
As a result, the "rest of the world" category is of particular interest. Because the asset programs have resulted in a large increase in the quantity of reserve balances in the banking sector, understanding if DIs have sold assets to the Federal Reserve sheds some light on the evolution of banks' balance sheets over the course of the programs. Finally, it should be noted that the "household" category is perhaps a bit different than the label might imply. Given the conventions and information available in generating the Flow of Funds data, hedge funds are usually included in the "household" category. As a result, instead of reflecting the actions of "true" households which may be less sophisticated investors, this group in fact contains some of the more sophisticated investors who may be expected to arbitrage across markets. 
Federal Reserve purchases from whom
This section walks through two general specifications to determine which entities sell securities to the Federal Reserve. The first is our baseline analysis, using an OLS specification, and the second is a modification to allow for panel estimation. We discuss each in turn. Baseline specification
To determine which investor types sell assets to the Federal Reserve, we begin with a series of regressions in which the dependent variables reflect changes in the asset holdings of a particular class of investor, and the independent variable of interest is changes in the Federal
Reserve's holdings of securities. First, we consider a baseline regression where changes in each investor type's holdings of Treasury securities or mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are regressed on an autoregressive term as well as the change in the Federal Reserve's holdings of that particular security, after controlling for changes in the outstanding issuance of that security.
That is,
where i is an index for the investment type that indicates the rest of the word, depository institutions (DIs), insurance companies, investment funds, pension and retirement funds, state and local governments, brokers and dealers, and households (HH); j indicates the security type, Table 1 shows the results from this baseline specification for Treasury securities. Each column in Table 1 refers to an investor type, as specified in equation (1). Tables 1-4 Table 1a suggest that households (which include hedge funds), broker-dealers, and insurance companies tend to be the ultimate sellers when the Federal Reserve buys Treasury securities (row 3). In addition, because we have a lagged dependent variable, the long-run effect needs to account for the partial adjustment. As a result, we also report . (row 7). Of course, that sample period is significantly longer than the Federal Reserve's asset purchase programs, and dynamics in financial markets could have changed. However, as shown in the results presented in table 1b, the results are robust to a shorter sample.
In economic terms, as reported in the bottom panel of Table 1 , we interpret these results to suggest that for LSAP1's $300 billion purchase of Treasury securities, the Federal Reserve ultimately purchased about $180 billion (roughly 60 percent) of these securities from households, about $45 billion from broker-dealers, and a smaller sum from insurance companies.
The broker-dealer result is somewhat surprising, as the broker-dealers should in principle be simply a conduit. However, dealers changed the composition of their balance sheets over this period, and this phenomenon may influence our results to some degree.
To further assess whether some investors view different types of assets as more or less substitutable than others, we explore the sensitivity of our results by analyzing separately longerterm and shorter-term Treasury securities. In Table 2 , we decompose the holdings of the Federal
Reserve's Treasury securities into bills and coupon securities. Very early in the financial crisis the Federal Reserve ran down its holdings of bills as it offset the increase in reserves of depository institutions from the expansion of Federal Reserve lending. In contrast, the LSAPs involved purchases of longer-term Treasury securities, and the MEP had both sales of short-dated securities and purchases of longer-dated ones. The breakdown in Table 2 allows us to distinguish between shorter-term (row 3) and longer-term (row 4) securities. Our findings suggest that different investors are on the opposite sides of the transaction for bills than for coupon securities.
Specifically, investment funds and insurance companies were the investor types that absorbed the decline in the Federal Reserve's holdings of bills, while households, broker-dealers, depository institutions, and insurance companies tended to be the ultimate sellers in transactions with the Federal Reserve. Focusing more closely on the asset program period in table 2b, the results are similar; in the shorter sample period, the results suggest that the rest of the world also increased bill holdings as Federal Reserve holdings declined. Tables 3a and 3b focus more specifically on the period when the Federal Reserve ran down its holdings of bills by adding an interactive dummy variable which is negative when the Federal Reserve reduced its bill holdings (row 4).
These results are similar to those reported above, and seem to suggest that insurance companies responded the most significantly to the runoff in the Federal Reserve's bill holdings.
Similar analysis is conducted for the Federal Reserve's purchases of MBS. As shown in Tables 4a and 4b , households (again, including hedge funds), investment companies, and pension and retirement funds are the ultimate sellers of these securities to the Federal Reserve (row 3).
Based on the estimates from these regressions, of the $1.25 trillion MBS purchases during LSAP1, we estimate that the Federal Reserve ultimately purchased nearly half of these securities from households and a bit over $200 billion from investment companies.
Panel specification
The results reported above are suggestive, however, they do rely on sample periods that include a substantial amount of time that is a different regime from the asset programs. With quarterly data, restricting the sample to only the most recent years would severely restrict the degrees of freedom in the estimation. To address the concern that the results may not be fully 
Portfolio rebalancing
Understanding what entity types sell securities to the Federal Reserve is instructive in discriminating across competing hypotheses for how the asset purchases work, especially in understanding the direct effect on Treasury securities. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) also ask how declines in Treasury yields spill over to yields on other assets. In principle, when the Federal Reserve buys safe, longer-term assets, it could induce investors to shift their portfolios toward other, potentially riskier assets, pushing down those yields. To examine that portfolio rebalancing effect, we investigate whether investor-types' portfolios changed in response to Federal Reserve actions.
The setup is as follows. We estimate a seemingly unrelated system of equations (SUR) for each investor type that appears to react significantly to Federal Reserve actions based on the previous regression results. We allow holdings of Treasury securities, MBS, corporate equity, corporate bonds, commercial paper, municipal securities and loans, and checkable deposits and currency to characterize the portfolios. We estimate the holdings of each of these assets as a separate equation in a system of seemingly unrelated regressions, regressing the asset holdings on Federal Reserve actions as we have done above, but also on other market measures that could affect portfolio holdings, such as the slope of the yield curve, risk spreads, and equity market volatility, all measured in basis points. of safe assets into riskier assets points to a credible channel for the effects of asset purchases on broader financial markets.
Conclusions and further research
In this paper, we tried to uncover the investor classes are the ultimate source of the securities that the Federal Reserve buys and how these investors then rebalance their portfolios.
Understanding these questions points to parts of the mechanism through which the Federal
Reserve's asset programs affect financial markets. We find that not all investor types sell to the Fed uniformly. Households (the group that includes hedge funds), broker-dealers, and insurance companies appear to be the largest sellers of Treasury securities when the Federal Reserve buys these securities. Households, investment companies, and to a lesser extent, pension funds, are the largest sellers of MBS when the Federal Reserve buys. When selling to the Fed, the households seem to rebalance their portfolios toward corporate bonds, commercial paper, and municipal debt and loans, while pension funds shift their portfolio toward repurchase agreements, or very short-term assets.
These results suggest that there is some segmentation in the markets for these securities and so a preferred-habitat motivation may be plausible. In addition, we find evidence that Federal Reserve purchases do not simply affect the yields on the assets purchased, but also induce investors to buy other assets, putting downward pressure on other market rates, as well.
We do not intend to say this is the last word on this topic but we aim to generate interest and start a fruitful discussion on this critical topic. A greater understanding of the time lag of how Federal
Reserve asset purchases eventually affect private sector holdings is still required. Moreover, although these results may be consistent with a preferred habitat theory and the portfolio rebalancing channel to monetary policy transmission, the link is not definitive and more work will need to be done to tie these empirical results to theoretical work. 
